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cant national security role in three types of conflict» 
(1) the intensifying political-economic conflict that is 
with us now, (2) the spectrum of limited wars which we 
may face at any time at the option of the enemy and, 
(3) the more remote possibility of general nuclear war. 
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in the area of ocean transportation and analyizes the 
ability of the United States Merchant Marine and the 
Military Sea Transportation Service to respond to these 
threats. The conclusion was reached that United States 
Merchant Marine and M3TS are wholly inadequate.  The 
Summary chapter makes some recommendations which may im- 
prove the effectiveness of both organizations with possible 
savings to the United States taxpayer. 
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CHAPT3H I 
INTRODUCTION 
In peace, as in war nearly 100 percent of United 
States overseas shipping is moved in ocean going vessels.^- 
In terms of cost per mile, ocean shipping has an advan- 
tage over all other types of transportation. Air trans- 
portation is the only alternative for overseas shipping 
and the largest airplane would not make a dent in the 
8,500 ton cargo of a Victory ship. Ocean shipping makes 
possible the application of our military power. It supp- 
lies our allies, carries material essential to our 
industries, and in summary, assists the United States 
in maintaining its position as a leading world power. 
THE PROBLEM 
The United States Merchant Marine and its mili- 
tary counterpart M3TS play a significant national 
security role in three types of threats which now con- 
front us; (1) the intensifying political-economic conflict, 
1George A. Lincoln, Bconomics of Nat;oqal |tffiai4|| 
(Snglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice - Hall, Inc., 
1959), P. 259. 
2 
(2) the spectrum of limlteci wars which we may face 
at any time at the option of the enemy and, (3) the 
more remote possibility of general nuclear war. 
In their political-economic offensiva, our op- 
ponents have avowed their intention to "bury" us in the 
field of international trade. The United States must 
ready its private Merchant Marine defensively to count- 
er economic thrusts — it must also be prepared to use 
it positively as a weapon in the cold war arsenal. 
United States Merchant Marine capabilities are 
considered adequate in quanity to meet the economic 
threats at this time, however, qualitative deficencies 
are more pronounced because basically the United States 
is still using the World War II type ships which are 
considered obsolete. The Merchant Marine and the United 
States Military Transportation Service are inadequate 
in quality and quantity in the types of ships that are 
required to fight future limited and general war. It 
is considered that a positive program designed to meet 
cold and limited war needs will produce an effective 
fleet for general war tasks. In the event of general 
nuclear war, ocean transportation could play a vital 
role in rescue, rehabilitation, and restoration during 
3 
the post attack period.  It Is likely to be the least 
damaged transportation resource, and as such this role 
should not dominate maritime and military transportation 
planning needs. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the threats 
to our national security in the area of ocean trans- 
portation, analyze the ability of the M3TS and the 
united States Merchant Marine to respond to the role 
assigned in meeting these threats, and will then con- 
sider and summarize some alternatives which may improve 
the effectiveness of both organizations with possible 
savings to the United States taxpayer. 
C0NSI03RATI0NS OP IMPORTANCB 
Assuming from past experience and from the pre- 
sent threats facing us that a united States Merchant 
Marine and a MSTS type organization is a necessity 
for the effective defense of our country, then It is 
correct to say that the organizations which yields the 
"highest achievement" with the least cost in terms of 
claims on scarce resources is the best alternative, or 
if this alternative is not available due to cost or 
other factors then the best alternative which achieves 
If 
a reasonable balance between conflicting consideration» 
Is desirable. 
How can we determine the alternative which gives 
us the "highest achievement" or Is the most effective? 
There are two major aspects which are considered of 
primary Importance when analyzing the effectlvenesi of 
MSTS and the United States Merchant Marine. 
Requirements for Ocean Transportatlory  Basic- 
ally there are two means of ocean transportation —by 
ship and by aircraft. In determining United ötatet 
ocean transportation requirements many questions arise 
which are difficult to answer. Irfhat are the extents 
of the threats? Prom where? Should ocean transpor- 
tation requirements be determined on all out war, 
limited war, or prolonged economic war? If we deter- 
mine our needs for limited and prolonged economic war, 
what part should be considered purely military, what 
part should the civilian Industry provide? Can past 
requirements be used as a criterion for determining 
future requirements? Can effective ocean transpor- 
tation requirement! be stated for the future In the 
face of conflicting Interests, policies, controls and 
ideas which prevail in the transportation industry and 
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the military today? Is thare time to prepare for con- 
flict or must requirements for effective transportation 
be based on readiness to do combat at any point In 
tine? The time factor along with the quality and 
quantity of the transport fleet is of crucial Importance 
when considering the return or payoff of a program In 
relation to the payoff of competing defense programs 
for scarce resources. 
Economic Considerations.  In appraising the 
effectiveness of ocean transportation, considerations 
must be given to the measures of economy to be derived 
from selected alternate alternatives. Certainly this 
Is not of minor Importance, The malntalnance of a 
strong economy over the long run will depend greatly 
on keeping defense expenditures In control by obtain- 
ing maximum return for every dollar expended. All 
other things being equal, the least expensive choice 
Is the best alternative. However, rarely does a 
choice narrow down to only a consideration of cost In- 
volved. The cheapest or most economical alternative 
Is not necessarily the best If vital Interests must 
be sacrificed. The cost must be balanced against the 
desired results with due consideration of all factors 
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involved. This implies that government operation is 
not necessarily desirable even though least costly or 
conversely, when the national security is at stake it 
may be essential to continue government activities at 
a higher cost then commercial service if the alterna- 
tives to higher cost is a sacrifice of security.  In 
considering alternatives for effective ocean transpor- 
tation operations we must recognize that there are 
certain functions which clearly are not suitable for 
the private Merchant Marine. On the other hand some 
services carriei on by KSTS are clearly within the 
capabilities of private industry and should be ob- 
tained from this source. 
CHAPT3R II 
SURVHIY OP TH3 THR3ATS 
Allen IdT. Dulles, former Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated the following: 
If the Soviet industrial-growth rate persists 
at 8 or 9 percent per annum over the next decade, 
as is forecast, the gap between our two economics 
by 1970 will be dangerously narrowed unless our 
own industrial-growth rate is substantially in- 
creased from the present pace.l 
The growth of the Soviets in the decade of the 
fifties increased by 7 percent per annum according to 
CIA estimates. During the same period, the United 
States increased its GNP by 3 percent per annum.2 
At this rate the USSR will eventually supplant the 
united States as production leader of the world. 
Growing at a rate nearly double that of the united 
States, the USSR now adds almost the same total volume 
of goods and services to its economy every year. The 
size of this annual increment, coupled with the USSR's 
allocation policies—specifically, the priority given 
1John P. Hardt, C. Darwin Stalzeaiach, and 
Martin J. Kohn, ShäL Cold Vja. Sconomic GSB (New York: 
Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc., 19ol), p. M-. 
2Ibid.. p. 7. 
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to programs designed to expand the Soviet international 
power position—and the already high level of cold 
war outlay, gives the United States concern over the 
speed of Soviet economic development. Furthermore, 
in production of strategic items alone, the Soviet 
growth is even greater than its industrial output as 
a whole. The annual increment in some industrial areas, 
for example, machine tool output is currently much 
higher in the Soviet Union than the United States, 
whether measured by physical units or value. Electric 
power is the only major industrial area in which the 
United States retains a clear cut le?.d in output in- 
crement, however, the extensive hydrolectric projects 
now under way in Siberia may cancel this advantage by 
1965.^ The Russians stress rapid expansion in pro- 
duction of those goods which they deem will enhance 
their power. 
Soviet military outlays now exceed those of the 
United States despite the fact that the total output 
of goods and service in the USSR is roughly half that 
in the United States.^ 
3lbid.. p. 13.  '♦Ifeiä.» P- 15. 
TH3 30VI3T MiftCHANT lUBXSB^S THR3AT 
ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT 
Allen Dulles, the former Director of CIA, 
summed up the Soviet threat in these wordsJ 
They, the Soviets will buy anything, trade 
anything, and dump anything if it advances 
communism and helps destroy the influence of 
the ^est.5 
A true dictatorship (the USSR) can do this, 
even if the economy is poor. The central power can 
channel any given segment of its economic strength 
to achieve a political gain at a given point in time 
even at the expense of other less important segments 
of the economy. 
Sino-Soviet Bloc Fleet. While the Soviet 
Union is historically a great land power rather than 
a naval or merchant marine power, it's revealing to 
see the degree to which Russia is concentrating its 
energies in developing its merchant marine capabilities 
In short, the Russians now understand sea power. The 
latest figures available indicate that the USSR has 
^Proposed Program £21 Maritime Ajqinlstyat3,011 
ResearchTcSmbuting Studies: Volume II. Washington, 
D. £7: National Academy of Sciences—National Re- 
search Council, I960), pp. 26-27 
10 
under their national flag an additional million tons 
D.W. of merchant shipping.6 An official Soviet pub- 
lication for Internal consumption carried an article 
entitled, "Prospective Plans for the Development of 
Naval Transportation f-om 1959 to 1965." In this 
document, the Russians say that the size of their 
merchant fleet by the end of 1965 Is planned to be, 
o^ar all 100 percent greater than the size of the 
fleet In I960. The USSR schedule expects an Increase 
of the dry cargo fleet during this period by 120 per- 
cent and tanker Increase by 80 percent.7 
These ships are not Inferior to what Is being 
produced In the United States or any shipyard In the 
"West." The Russians plan Is to mass produce freigh- 
ters and tankors between 10,000 to 13,000 tons D.W. 
with a cruising speed of 18 knots. By 1975 they ex- 
pect to Increase the fleet capacity to four fold that 
of 1958.Ö 
^Vlee-Admlral Ralph I« Wilson, U3N, Retired, 
"Soviet Maritime Activities," MatUie Jqurqa;, 




The Russian ships being built are up to date, 
and have such features as, mechanical hatch covers, 
unstayed bipod masts, air conditioning, and two man 
rooms for the crews. Some of the small type ships 
are equipped with shipboard cranes and adjustable- 
pitch propellers. 
The shipyards of Russia range in technical 
development from very advanced to the most primitive. 
Larger yards such as the Baltic and Admiralty ship- 
yards in Leningrad and the Nosea'-o yard in Nikolayer 
are in some respects more advanced than those in 
Western Europe and the United States. In welding 
techniques and weld-testing equipment, the shipyard 
industry of the USSR is equal to that of the Western 
powers. 
Among other "yardsticks," it is against this 
background of development of the merchant fleets of 
the communist bloc that the united States must appraise 
the current situation in the united States Merchant 
Marine. Frankly, the United States is in trouble 
and Its position needs strengthening and on a large 
scale. Today there are approximately 950 United States 
flag ships under private operation. Certain segments 
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of the fleet, notably tankers engaged in the coast- 
wise trade, can reasonably be expected to maintain 
t 
their own, but in the area of foreign trade the 
united States comes face to face not only with the 
competition of ships under friendly foreign flags but 
with the economic penetration techniques of the Soviet 
Union, and the American merchant fleet is loosing 
ground. 
There is always the possibility that the Sino- 
Soviet Bloc could or would use its fleets as instru- 
ments of economic warfare rather than primarily as 
national services.  If such a policy were carried to 
the extreme, it is conceivable that the Bloc would en- 
gage foreign ships to carry its own import-export trade 
and would use its present foreign trade fleet to compete 
against free world vessels for free world cargo. This 
piecemeal disruptive effect could be rather severe, 
not only by 1975, but now. 
The use of rate undercutting could overcome 
any characteristics of Soviet vessels which are inferior 
to those of the modern segment of the world fleet. The 
Soviet Bloc fleets can be used to service the under- 
developed nation as a form of economic penetration. 
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This is already being done. Scheduled lires are expand- 
ing to make regular calls in Near East and Southeast 
Asia ports as well as African and South American ports. 
Much of this operation is done at a loss, but they are 
making inroads for future trade. 
A Joint maritime organization, "The Committee 
on Transportation for Mutual Sconomic Assistance," 
acts as a central control agency for all 31oc fleets 
and could present a very effective competitive front. 
This organization is being used in close support of 
nommunist International political and economic ob- 
jectives* 
LIMITED WAR 
The threat of future limited wars is more serious 
now then it ever has been.    This means of power thrusts ^ 
is becoming more popular due to the realization by both 
the East and the West that all-out war, with both sides 
having nuclear delivery capability, can mean mutual 
suicide* 
If this assumption is correct it is considered 
that limited wars will be on something of a lesser scale 
than the Korean war and any conflict tending to go above 
Ik 
the Korean level would change to general war. The use 
of submarines, mines, missiles, and bombers, or any 
means used to change the lines of sea communications 
would tend to alter the limited conflict to general 
war and as such, attrition rates in ocean transportation 
in a limited type conflict can be considered of minor 
importance.^ 
Two points that cannot be over stressed in 
limited war are, (1) the areas where fighting can be 
expected to occur are areas where there are few or no 
port facilities and those that are in existance may be 
of the crudest types, and (2) in fighting limited wars 
the United States must maintain and improve its security 
position in other areas at the same time. This puts a 
greater demand on united States ocean transport require- 
ments, and must be considered in determining the size 
of the future merchant fleet. 
G3NSRAL WAS 
Damage estimates for general war are extremely 
difficult to gauge in this day of nuclear capabilities, 
9Ibid.. p. a. 
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It may depend on the overall-kill and damage planned by 
the Soviets.  That is, assuming the United States does 
not strike first. The Merchant Marine's survival in 
such a situation would vary depending on such things 
as ports hit, amount of notice of impending attack, 
and the dispersion of the ships at s«a and in port. 
The general contention is that the merchant fleet will 
be least damaged and that adequate ocean transportation 
requirements for limited and economic war would adequate- 
ly supply the demands of a post-nuclear attack. 
CHAPTER III 
U.S.  0C3AN TaANSPORTATION'S ABILITY 
TO RBSPONO TO THB THHSATS 
The present inadequacy of United States ocean 
transportation is a matter of vital concern to the 
government, to industry, and very particularly to the 
military services.    Foreign shipping policies and the 
number of relatively new foreign vessels are causing 
the United States increasing difficulty in meeting 
foreign competition,  even for the subsidized portion 
of the United States merchant fleet.    Reasons for the 
decline are many.    In the unsubsidized portion of the 
United States fleet, operational costs are almost pro- 
hibitive.     In both the subsidized and unsubsidized 
segments,  construction costs are high.    There is a 
general lack of incentive to take advantage of tech- 
■ 
nological advances to offset costs. 
i . ... - 
Normal foreign trade and the au^lity to cope with 
the threat of economic war is primarily the concern of 
the private segment of the shipping industry. The 
United States merchant fleet is adequate In quantity 
at the present, but inadequate in quality. The 
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inadequacy In quantity will be added to the inadequacy 
in quality if our present inaction in this field con- 
tinues to prevail. 
RESP0N33 IN POLITICAL-BCONOMIC WAR 
The response of the united States in the current 
and future political-economic war must entail positive 
as well as preventive action.    The united States must 
be available to deliver substantial potions of United 
States economic and military aid to bolster those 
nations whose support ind friendship the United States 
wishes to maintain.    In certain circumstances the United 
States must be prepared to undertake pre-emptive buy- 
ing of the excess produce of countries when commercial 
and military alliances are desired,  and must be prepared 
to use United 3tates bottoms for this. 
Defensively, United States flag shipping must be 
available to counter rate cutting action and attempts 
to capture the free world trade by the Sino-Soviet Bloc.1 
^-Proposed Prograa for Maritime Administration 
Research (Contributing JjtuJTes:    volume II.    Washington 
D. C.»    Natioral Academy of Sciences—National Research 
Council, I960),  p.  31« 
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The expanding industrial economy of the united States 
has grown increasingly dependent on foreign sources 
of raw material—and on foreign markets for its pro- 
ducts. Adequate modern shipping under united States 
control is required to insure the timely and steady 
flow of imports and exports of material. 
In examining the capabilities of the United 
States Merchant Marine, the inventory of United States 
flag and "flag of convenence" shipping yields disturb- 
ing data. 
As of 30 June, i960 total United States flag 
vessels both active and inactive totaled 2,93'+, of this 
number 951 were active and 1,983 were in the inactive 
status.2 Of the 951 in the active status only 25 per- 
cent are of post World War II construction and many of 
these are of the same plans and designs as the ships 
built during the war. Projected construction plans 
show negligible proaise of off-setting the rapid 
approaching obsolescence of the vast majority of the 
active fleet. The same holds true of government con- 
trolled shipping. Of the 1,983 «bips in the inactive 
fleet, about 1,200 are composed of Liberty ships.3 
2lbid.  3lbid. 
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These are being scrapped and are not being considered 
for reactivation. 
A significant part of the United States private- 
ly owned tanker and dry bulk fleet is now operated 
under the flags of Panama, Liberia, and Honduras 
(PanLibHon)—the so-called, "flags of convenience 
fleet." The number of active vessels now under the 
operation of these flags totals 378 ships with 1^9 in 
the general and oulk cargo category, 7 in the passenger 
ship group and 223 tankers of various lift capacities.1* 
These ships account for about 70 percent of the united 
States total tonnage in bulk cargo carriers and  about 
50 percent of the United States total tonnage in tankers. 
Many of these ships are new, fast, and modern in design. 
They operate competitively and without subsidy primarily 
because shipowners are not required to par U.S. wage 
scales when operating under foreign flags. In addition, 
some of thsse ships enjoy the advantage of lower amorti- 
zatior costs due Co construction in foreign yards. 
Increasing pressures, both domestic and foreign, 
may make it economically impracticable for United States 
'»Ibid. 
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shipowners to continue operation under PanLibHon flags. 5 
If the ability to operate under such,   "flags of 
convenience," registries were to be denied to our ship- 
owners,  the vessels might well be turned over to nou- 
United States controlled foreign register/, with a 
consequent loss to united States controlled shipping 
ability.    The 1,060 active United States controlled 
ships carry about 20 percent of the united States 
foreign trade tonnage, and as can be seen from the 
data above, the United States flag merchant marine 
carries something less then 8 percent of our foreign 
trade cargo.    This is a far cry from what the framers 
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 had in mind as to 
what was a fair share of United States trade to be 
carried in united States bottoms for the protection 
of our shipping industry and needs of our military in 
war.    It is difficult to understand how a nation which 
is so far sighted in other areas would allow such a 
dangerous hole to -xist in its over-all security 
efforts. 
21 
RBSP0N33 IN LIMITED WAR 
The Navy's Sea Transportation Service operates 
for the primary purpose of providing the required sea 
lift transportation service to the Department of 
Defense.^ 
The present world conditions requires our mili- 
tary forces to be prepared to execute strategic plans 
without delay.    The concept of Immediate responsive- 
ness to military command was explained by Vice-Admiral 
F. C,  Denebrink a former KSTS Commander as follows: 
Military Commanders1 nust have under their 
command,  and responsive  uo their immediate orders, 
the capability of logistic support.    Transportation 
is one of the most Important facts of logistics and 
It is axiomatic in the military that the logistic 
support must be responsive to the military Commander 
who is charged with the credit or victory or the re- 
sponsibility of defeat.7 
To meet military requirements rapid reaction, 
60eorge C. Dyer, Naval Logistics    (Wisconsin! 
George Banta Company, I960), p. 139. 
''united States Congress,  Senate, Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, tUU^J ££* Trans- 
portatlon Service. Hearings before Subcommittee, ma ÖongressV ^nd.  Session, on Operations and Functions 
of the Military Sea Transport Service and 3.822, March 
15-17, 1956    (Washington»    Government Printing Office, 
19565, p. (*• 
■ 
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particularly In a limited war situation, can well mean 
the difference between a possible larger war erupting 
and one which does not. 
The cu-rent operations of MSTS consists of what 
is considered primarily 90 percent semi-commercial in 
nature and 10 percent pure military in nature. The 
conventional Vorld tfar II type ships under the control 
of M3T3 are inadequate from the standpoint of quantity 
and quality for fighting any kind of war. They are too 
slow in speed, in loading, and in discharging to be 
fully responsive to military requirements for rapid 
reaction. The limited wars that are envisioned for the 
future—that is, fighting in backward areas with few or 
no port facilities, may prove the present ships of MSTS 
quite useless. 
Time may not allow for build up, and ships of 
the United States merchant fleet may not be available 
to back up the military nucleus fleet in limited war if 
threats in other areas require us to maintain our 
military and trade postures in a high degree of readiness. 
The ships in the reserve fleet may prove of no value if 
time is of the essence or if these ships are unable to 
be used in the fighting area. It may not be possible 
23 
to depend on foreign shipping due to excessive costs 
and possible hesitancy of other nations in getting in- 
volved in actions considered detrimental to their own 
national interests. The present mode of MSTS operations 
is considered contrary to the proposition that military 
transportation must be responsive to the fleet and will 





In order for us to get the most out of the 
nation's resources, we should devote fewer millions 
to an activity if some of its output is worth less 
than the cost—and spend still more millions on it, 
If extra output would yield greater value than the 
other things the money could buy.l 
The above implies that in evaluating alternatives, 
one must consider both cost in scarce resources and the 
pay-off which will result. It does not matter how 
economical or expensive a governmental program is, if 
it does not accomplish its task or mission to an accept- 
able degree. In either case the cost is too high. 
If the proposition that both a merchant marine 
and military sea transportation are necessary for United 
itates national security, then the United States must 
determine the best means for obtaining this in terms of 
dollar costs, and in terms of estimated pay-off which 
will result. 
———————— 
1Roland N. McKean, "Evaluating Alternative 
Expenditure Programs'* (Santa Monica: The Rand 
Corporation, 19*9), P. I. (Mlieographed) 
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THE U.S. MSRCHANT MARINS 
The U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provides 
that the United States will have a national flag merchant 
marine sufficient to carry all Its domestic water borne 
commerce, and a "substantial portion" of Its foreign 
trade. The general interpretation of a "substantial 
portion" means 50 percent of the United States foreign 
trade.  In addition, the U.S. Merchant Marine Is to be 
adequate to act as, "the fourth arm of defense," during 
war. 
3ven with substantial subsidy programs the United 
States Merchant Marine has been unable to cope with 
foreign competition and during times of peace the United 
States fleet has always carried less then half of the 
American foreign trade. The United States policies on 
subsidies to the merchant marine have been a failure 
from the standpoint of maintaining a sound and thriving 
industry. The provisions of the Act of 1936 to provide 
for replacement of current tonnage are not adequate. 
A recent article in a leading financial weekly stated 1 
The Merchant Marine Act, as even its staunchest 
avocatea now concede, has failed its purpose. After 
25 years, like most ships, it is hopelessly obsolete. 
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Surely the time has come to replace it with some- 
thing better.2 
The subsidy system offers little incentive toward 
self-sufficiency on the part of the shipping Industry, 
and has cost the United States taxpayer an average of 
150 million dollars per year since 195^.^ There is 
no definite and adequate plan to Insure that the merchant 
fleet will meet the threats of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 
future political-economic cold war. Continuation of the 
current subsidies policy, will aid in the construction 
and operations of '♦50 new ships over the next twenty 
years.  This against the plans of the Soviets to build 
about 3,200 vessels by 1975. 
The present administration of the subsidy system 
is an obstacle to the progress of the American merchant 
marine. Military requirements demand high-speed cap- 
abilities and special defense features which are not 
. 
2
"Tide of Subsidy," Barron's. National Bn?tne?s 
ana Pinancial Vfftalül,  (March 20, 1961) p.l. 
^United Statej Congress, Joint Economic Committee 
Heport,    Subsidy and fflrtaldyllke Programs &£ tj^e U^S. 
Governmentt Both Congress, 2d Session. December 1571960 
nfoshlngtoat    Government Printing Office i960), p.  21. 
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wholly consistent with commercial interests of economy 
in administering construction subsidies. Many feel 
that the subsidies presently create inconsistent aims 
for labor, business, and government in the maritime 
industry. The operator is encouraged to over-specify 
his construction needs, knowing that half of the cost 
will be paid by the government. By the same token, 
the operator over-emphasizes economy in unsubsidized 
operating costs and cares little about subsidized costs. 
unsubsidized operators show a strong incentive 
to reduce cost, such as through use of automation, 
whereas foreign operators and subsidized operators are 
less motivated in this direction. Labor costs for for- 
eign operators are, of course, much lower then that of 
the United States, therefore the need to reduce labor 
costs by installation of high cost automation equipment 
is less pronounced. The subsidized United States shipp- 
ers allow the government to pick up the tab for their 
uncompetitive operations. 
What is the answer in obtaining a future effective 
United States Merchant Marine? There is a growing move- 
ment favoring subsidy reduction and increasing emphasis 
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on developing methods and devices leading to a shipping 
Industry which provides maximum productivity through 
more efficent use of current high cost labor. A vigor- 
ous program of research can point the way to the develop- 
ment of such an efficient fleet, one that is able to 
face world competition with substantially less subsidy 
assistance,  Subsidities would be justified when vessels 
are built with special military features which are not 
usable in competition for foreign trade. Such operations 
which are designed to counter Russia's cold war tactics 
would have to be considered as a cost of defense and 
would require governmental funding. 
The united States merchant fleet is still adequate 
from the standpoint of quantity and some delay in replac- 
ing obsolete vessels may be justified if research and 
development will point the way to technologically 
superior ships and operational methods. President 
Eisenhower in an annual budget message had this to say 
about the role of research in plans for rebuilding the 
United States merchant fleet: 
Sfforts to maintain a U.S. merchant fleet 
adequate to meet defense requirements are seriously 
hampered by high operating costs. To preserve the 
capability of our merchant fleet without placing an 
undue burden on the taxpayer will require willingness 
by ship operators, maritime labor and the government 
JEpyf*^ 
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to explore arid adopt new solutions. Sxpanding work 
on advanced ship design could bring sharply reduced 
operating costs. 3y expanding the operations of the 
subsidized fleet, over a somewhat longer period, the 
results of their research can be more fully explored 
in replacement plans.4. 
Operating a ship beyond the designed 20 year life 
is of course possible, but costs of maintainance and re- 
pair become substantially higher. The economic compet- 
itiveness of United States vessels could be greatly im- 
proved simply by exploiting currently available techno- 
logical devolcpment in unitized cargo handling systems, 
automation of most shipboard operations, improving sea- 
keeping propartl^s of the vessels, and by improving pro- 
pulsion plants. It is probable that shipbuilding costs 
can be lowered through Improved shipbuilding procedure 
and gcTernmental shipping policies. 
A strong case can be made for basing maritime 
policy solely upon the desire to attain national defense 
objectives.^ This would facilitate policy making. The 
primary advantage of simplification of objectives would 
i 
^Präsident Dwight D. Eisenhower, united States, 
Budget AdlUU & ££a&mi, January 1959 
^Wytze Gorter, United otates Shlppir^ Policy 
rkt    Harper and Brothers, 195o), p. 192. (New Yor  
.12 li 
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be that policy and administrative decisions would be based 
solely upon the requirements of:  national defense. This 
would Include requirements to fight political-economic 
warfare. Vessel operators and shipbuilders would be 
helped only If defense requirements call for their con- 
tinued operation.  It Is considered that United States 
shipping policies could best be administered through the 
department of Defense vice the Department of Commerce. 
If public expenditures for merchant vessels were to be 
the responsibility of the Department of Defense, then 
the Department of Defense would be forced to decide just 
how important this, "fourth arm of defense," is to it. 
Putting the united States maritime policy matters under 
th< Department of Defense would place it in the organ!- 
zation which Is best suited to deal with defense matters. 
After all, the only excuse for the united States Merchant 
Marine in existence today is to assist in the national 
defense effort. 
To a great measure the greatest problem is con- 
vincing the maritime Industry of the great promise and 
practicability of trying new ideas and making both 
6im., PP. 1<*-195. 
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management and labor aware of the potential benefits of 
technological progress. A fleet of efficient modern 
ships made competitive In world trade through advanced 
scientific and techno'.oglcal progress would lie  sufficient 
to provide us with a future adequate floet to counter 
economic war and conduct normal trad« with minimum sub- 
sidy payments. Subsidy payments for military features 
In selected merchant ships would provide the needed 
assistance to the military to counter limited war threats. 
The Initial ccst of this program would be high and govern- 
ment financing would be necessary. Cost reductions have 
been substantial for the few companies that have tried 
new Inovatlons and show the road for a future competitive 
United States Merchant Marine. 
MSTS 0PSÄATI0NS 
On various occasions since Its Inception In 19^9» 
the operations of the Military Sea Transportation Ser- 
vice have bean criticized as being competitive with the 
privately-owned American merchant marine. Critics in 
the shipping industry and withir the government have 
questioned the necessity for continued operation of MSTS 
ships contending that t#s privately-owned shipping lines 
Wl 
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are being deprived of military cargoes which they are 
capable of handling. Charges have been made that MSTS 
operations are in conflict with the national maritime 
policy under \ bich the government pledges support and 
aid to the maintainance of the privately-owned United 
States flag merchant marine. Critics have also asserted 
that economies could be realized by greater utilization 
of commercial shipping sources in lieu of continued 
operations of government-owned MSTS ships. One of the 
congressional subcommittees reported in 1955 that, in 
their opinion, some MSTS operations were in diiect com- 
petition with the merchant marine, and that there were 
no shipping services performed by MSTS which had not 
been or could not be, performed just as well by private 
industry without danger to the national security.7 The 
second Hoover commission conducted a thorough study of 
MSTS operations in 195^ with particular emphasis on the 
question of encroachment by MSTS on potential business 
'United States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Operation^ 
tf Military §& TrfflSmfoUPQ §frYU? in folÄUQB 12 
airrta4qarw9, ^ ^äMäMSäräC^i^m^OSne. 
Report of the Special Subcommittee, ojd Congress, 2d 
Session on Operations of MSTS. January 3, 1955 (Wash- 
ington» Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 15-17» 
dk 
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for the private shipping industry.8 This transportation 
.lubcommittee concluded, among other things, that MST3 
was perforailng a substantial amount of services which 
private industry could assume, and that certain vessels 
of the MSTS nucleus fleet could be removed from service. 
On the other side of the coin, supporters of the 
MSTS operations argue that MSTS has in its 12 years of 
active existence, managed to reduce the cost per ton- 
mile of cargo and per passenger-mile substantially and 
has correspondingly decreased its tariff rates. It has 
laid up ships when it has found that commercial operators 
could perform the service at a lower rate and has stream- 
lined both its afloat and ashore organization for maximum 
economy. It is an organization which is extremely cost- 
conscious. Wienaver its tariff rates are above the norm 
it soon hears from its three main customers in no un- 
certain terras.^ 
And so the argument goes, pro and con. The 
_____________ 
"Commission on Organization of the Sxecut.'.ve Branch 
of the Government, Subcommittee Report on Transportation! 
1955» (Washingtont Government printing Ornce, 19^5J, 
pp7"209-2l8. 
^RABT Arimir.il Rr v A. Gano. USN. Laetura. Naval 
arguments are largely academic, and the parties to the 
arguments cannot see, "the forest for the trees." 
Irrespective of how a government organization is organiz- 
ed, financed, managed, or how economical its operations 
are, if it does not accomplish what it is intended for, 
then—the organization is quite useless, and the costs 
in risk to united States national security and in tax- 
payers dollars are too great. 
The importance of the Military Sea Transportation 
Service type organization is to provide a nucleus group 
of ships with the ability to react rapidly to limited 
and general war requirements.10 Not only should it pro- 
vide ships that are physically capable of doing this, but 
also the organization should be so organized and per- 
sonnel so trained that the ships can be quickly inter- 
grated into fast task group type amphibious operations. 
k limited war crisis could well become a race against 
time to evacuate nationals, to r vlaploy troops, or 
augment and resupply existing forces overseas. 
10Unlted States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Military Sea transport 
Service. Hearings before Subcommittee, S'+dcongress, 2d 
session, on Operations and Functions or the Military Sea 
Transport Service and S. 822, March 15-17, 1956 (Wash- 
ington» Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 9-10. 
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Modern high speed ships of speeds over 25 knots 
are considered mandatory,   "Over the beach" discharge is 
considered likely,  at least during the initial seizure 
phases in an active combat situation.    Where port facili- 
ties are available improved off-loading requirements 
must bo met, a present-day cargo ship off-loading time 
averages five days.    The development and use of rapid 
cargo handling facilities aboard ship together with 
unltlzed cargo practices,  and employment of roll-on, 
roll-off type ships for handling vehicular cargo is 
considered necessary in future war operations.    Fast 
smaller troop-carrying ships with possible carrying 
capacities of 500-1,000 troops are needed for small 
scale operations.    Speeds up to 30 knots would naturally 
cut down the reaction time for this type of ship. 
Larger passenger liners and transports for use as troop 
carriers may be found useless in the future limited 
wars. 
How adequate is the present Military Sea Transport 
Service organization?    Basically it is made up of passen- 
ger, cargo, and tanker vessels of World War II vintage 
with speeds of less then 22 knots.    These vessels have 
few or no special military feature that are not now 
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incorporated in the United States controlled merchant 
fleet. The cargo and passengers carried are to a great 
extent carried to and from areas being serviced or 
that could be serviced by the merchant fleet. Many 
military commercial type operations parallel services 
provided by private owners over the same routes. The 
ships operating for MSTS are scattered all over the world 
with few or none in major United States ports. Quick 
recall of these ships for a specific limited war situa- 
tion would be extremely difficult. The ships in the 
reserve fleets are not ready for immediate use—past 
experience has shown that two to three months are re- 
quired before these ships are ready for the first sail- 
ing. 
The Military Sea Transport Service organiza- 
tionally is under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval 
Operations but it is not actively directed by CNO— 
the fact it, MSTS Is far removed from the other active 
fleet activities. Little if any training of MSTS 
vessels with fleet units takes place. 
The mixed civilian and military personnel in MSTS 
nucleus vessels make exercising and operating with the 
fleet nearly impossible. The mixed civilian and military 
37 
M3TS shore establishment is oriented toward economic 
operations from the standpoint of efficient business 
operations. They are comtantly comparing the Mili- 
tary Sea Transportation Service operational efflcencles 
with that of the civilian Industry. Little Interest 
is shown to how effective the organization is in re- 
sponding to emergency limited war operations. 
It is considered that the MSTS operations con- 
ducted today could and should, except in few isolated 
instances, be completely handled by the United States 
merchant fleet.    The Military Sea Transportation 
Service operations are purely commercial or quasi-mili- 
tary in nature and are in no way better suited to pro- 
vide the military logistics support in time of war then 
the United States Merchant Marine.    The history of 
World Var II and Korea show no record of reluctance or 
incapability on the part of the United States Merchant 
Marine to handle Military logistics requirements.    Only 
h percent of the initial support requirements for Korea 
were directly supplied by MSTS.U 
— 
^Ibide,     PP.     123-125. 
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A strong sTibsidizod merchant marine is consider- 
ed necessary to provide response to political-economic 
threats and to the military in war. Maintaining a 
largo military sea transportation organization that 
basically does the same thing, with the same type ships, 
does not make sense. To argue that the KSTS operations 
are more economical is academic in nature and if we 
accept such a premise we argue for socialism. The 
General Accounting Office found it nearly impossible to 
compare MSTS operations with that of the private opera- 
tor a. 12 Many resources are provided MSTS which do not 
enter into the profit or loss statement. The Military 
Sea Transportation Service operations can be compared 
with children making money on lemonade stands. The 
profits are high, the price low. The lemons, water, 
sugar, and ice come from mother's kitchen and are  not 
included in the cost. It amounts to the taxpayer sub- 
sidizing the Merchant Marine and funding the Military 
•^United States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Study 
of the Operations of Military 3ea TraMporlftUgn BJCftati 
Hearings before Special Subcommittee, 03d Congress, 2d 
Session, July 8-15, 1951* (Vfashingtont Government Print- 
ing Office), pp. 595-631« 
ä 
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Sea Transportation Service operations directly for doing 
the same thing. 
The Navy has logistic type ships in the Service 
Forces, Amphibious Forces, and in the MSTS.    It is con- 
sidered that the pure military needs of the services 
would be best served by intergrating the cargo and 
tanker vessels of the MSTS nucleus fleet into the pre- 
sent organization of the Service Forces--and the passen- 
ger vessels into the Amphibious organization.    This 
would be the logical step in making these ships respon- 
sive to the military commanders' for quick reaction. 
Inter-service exercises at sea would soon spell 
out the needs in types of ships and training necessary 
to provide for pure military logistic support.    The 
requirements of each service would be submitted to the 
Navy.    The Navy in turn would be responsible to request 
the funds and provide the services needed. 
The British past and present armed forces 
logistic support has been substantially all carried in 
commercial bottoms.    This Is handled by the Sea Trans- 
port Division of the British Ministry of Transport, 
The Sea Transport Division is primarily a freight for- 
warder and chartering agency which meets the transportation 
ä 
ho 
requirements submitted to it by the Army, Air Force, 
Navy and othar governmental agencies.  The Director of 
the Sea Transport Division negotiates and makes the 
charters for the British government, the rates being 
determined by the free flow of supply and demand in 
the market.13 
A small similar Military Sea Transport Service 
organization staffed by members of the three services 
and agent members of the commercial shipping companies 
seems like a logical means for coordinating the military 
commercial shipping requirements and handling the 
administrations work Involved both during cold and hot 
war. 
—Ä———— 
■^United States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Study 
af tfca Operations fi£ Military Saa Transportation Service. 
Hearings before Special Subcommittee,  83d Congress,  2d 
Session, May Ik, 199* (Washington:    Government Printing 
Office),  pp. 201-207. 
CHAPTER ? 
SUMMARY 
The United States Is now confronted by three 
types of threats to its national security. These are 
political-economic cold war, limited war and general 
war. Cur opponents, the Communist Bloc have avowed to 
"bury us" In International trade. They are putting 
more pressure on the United States by limited war 
tactics, and may resort to general war If all their 
attempts to expand world communism by other means fall. 
The Soviet economy In the last decade has grown 
at twice the rate of the United States. The USSR gives 
priority to programs designed to expand the Soviet 
international power position.  The production of stra- 
tegic material is stressed and its rate of increase is 
greater then the industrial output in other areas. 
The Russians' stress rapid expansion in production 
for use In military consumption. Despite the fact that 
the total output of goods and services in the USSR is 
roughly half that in the United States, their military 
outlays now exceed those of the United States. 
The Sino-Soviet Bloc is concentrating a great 
* 
deal of energy In developing their merchant fleet capa- 
bilities.    Soviet flag merchant vessels now number about 
800 vessels totaling H million tons D.  W,  and by 1975 
they expect to increase the fleet capacity four fold. 
Soviet ships are increasingly expanding their foreign 
trade in bael~'ard country areas and primarily,  these 
fleets are instruments of economic warfare,  and their 
use for national service is given onlv secondary con- 
sideration. 
The United States asrchant fleet basically is 
not suited for competitive international trade.    This 
is due to great extent to high labor costs in the opera- 
tion of the vessels and construction.     The militant 
marine labor unions are continually exerting pressure 
for higher wages and have been extremely successful in 
getting what they have asked for.    While the ü. S. 
fleet is adequate in quantity to cope with normal for- 
eign trade and economic war requirements,  it's not com- 
petitive and relies heavily on governmental subsidies. 
In quality the United States fleet is obsolete and 
little is being done either by the government or private 
industry to correct this. 
The "PanLibHon" vessels which total about 378 
^ 
^3 
ships of various categories are of material help now In 
providing shipping needs of the United States but in- 
creasing pressure,  both domestic and foreign, may dry 
up this source if United States owners are forced to 
turn over these ships to non-U.S, controlled foreign 
registry.    Many of these ships are new, fast, and of 
modern designs. 
The United States active fleet totals about 951 
ships.    The inactive fleet totals about 2,000 ships, 
1,200 of these are Liberties which are now being  scrapp- 
ed and are considered too slow for reactivation.    The 
shipr     . the inactive fleet may prove useless if time 
is of the essence in a limited war.    The United States 
under present plans will construct about ^50 new ships 
tinder the United States subsidy policy in the next 20 
years.    This,  against the rapidly expanding merchant 
marine building program of the Russians, is wholly in- 
adequate even when taking into account the ships that 
may be available from time to time from other nations. 
What is the answer to correct the United States 
inadeauacies?   Ihei«« As a growing trend to buy time— 
and run the obsolete ships a few years longer so as to 
allow Increasing emphasis on developing methods and 
Mi 
devices leading to more efficient ship operations with 
corresponding lower operating cost, which In turn would 
make the United States Merchant Marine competitive 
In world markets with less subsidy help. 
There have been many arguments,  pro and con, con- 
cerning the operations of the MSTS organization.    Prom 
the standpoint of effectiveness In Its future role In 
fighting limited and general war the MSTS fleet Is 
considered Inadequate.    The ships are of World War II 
vintage and are obsolete.    The number of vessels with 
special military character4 sties are few and the number 
of active MSTS ships appears to be too small to carry 
out a war logistic operation, without commercial ship 
help—in addition,  the present IISTS organization is 
oriented toward cosmerclal  business typo efficiencies 
and does not seem too concerned about Its future war- 
fare role.    The MSTS organization is large, costly, and 
basically duplicates the efforts of the United States 
Merchant Marine.    The argument by the military to what 
is pure military logistics in nature is based on tradition 
and does not hold v^er in today's sltu&tlon because 
the merchant marine must be considered a Integral part 
of our defense effort due to the increasing political- 
^5 
economical threats facing the United States. Today's 
large expenditures for defense do not allow the United 
States the luxury of the government duplicating a civil 
industry effort when the civil Industry has proven 
that It can do the job as veil or better—World Wsr II 
and Korea have shown that the merchant fleet Is well 
adapted to handle military logistics support which Is 
not directly Involved In supplying the military forces 
during Initial penetration efforts. Military logistics 
support forces contain three elements: (1) The Mobile 
Support group of ships, (2) The Underway Replenishment 
group of ships, and (3) The Pipeline group of ships. 
The direct support of the military forces to, and in 
military and under military command due to the very 
nature of the close support tasks assigned. The Pipeline 
group of ships would replenish both the Mobile Support 
and the Underway Replenishment ships and this support 
could well be provided by civilian shippers. 
What can be done to make the United States Ocean 
Transportation more effective? The following are not 
recommendations as such, but are presented as possible 
the combat area must be supplied by the Mobile Support 
and Underway Replenishment f.nips. These ships must be 
. 
«f6 
alternatives which may give us better ocean transporta- 
tion at a lesser cost in united States tax dollars: 
1. Combine all matters of policy relating to 
ocean shipping—both civil and military in nature, 
under the Department of Defense. This governmental 
department is considered to be best adapted to admin- 
ister policies that concern an industry so closely 
related to the united States military defense effort. 
2. Disestablish the MSTS organization and 
distribute the commercial and quasi-military cargo 
lifts to commercial carriers and transfer to the 
"Service" and "Amphibious" forces the responsibility 
to provide adequate pure military logistics support 
for the services in connection with limited and 
general war efforts. 
3. Reduce the number of ships in the reserve 
fleet to a point which would adequately provide a 
source of vessels to commercial operators for use 
in normal trade and political-ecunomic warfare 
purposes. These ships are considered useless for 
future pure military purposes. The time factor of 
readying these ships for sailing alone makes these 
ships unresponsive for limited and general war 
^7 
purposes. 
if. Efforts should be made to bring United States 
controlled vessels In the "flag of convenience" 
group beck under the "flag of the United States". 
This nay require finding solutions for the {ilgh labor 
and construction costs which forced the operators 
to transfer these ships to other flags. Incorporat- 
ing labor saving devices with governmental subsidy 
assistance may be an answer. 
5* There are Increasing Indications that re- 
search and development In such areas as Navigational 
systems, New Propulsion means, Charting, Personnel, 
Human Engineering, Mechanization and Automation, 
Statutory and Regulatory matters, Expediting, 
Special Ship types, and Requirement studies based on 
the threats we face. Is the solution In obtaining 
a commercial and military logistics fleet capable 
of meeting the threats of war and competition. 
6. Combining basic and operational research and 
development efforts, funded by the government, under 
a Operational Research and Development Group, (logi- 
cally under the "Service forces"), would provide a 
▲ 
1*8 
coordinating organization which should result in 
better utilization of proven and tested new inovations 
by the military and the commercial operators. Basic 
research studies could be farmed out to the many in- 
stitutions now working in this field, 
7* The initial cost of implementing and build- 
ing ships with improved features will be high and 
it is considered that higher subsidies to civilian 
industries and direct funding to the military will 
be required to get the program rolling—but the long 
range pay-off—should more then off-set the research, 
development, and building costs. 
8. A small MSTS organization staffed by members 
of the three services and agent members of the commer- 
cial shippers, and acting primarily as a "Freight 
Forwarder and Charter Agency*' seems a logical means 
for coordinating the military commercial shipping re- 
quirements through the commercial shippers. This 
means has been effectively utilized by the British 
in the past. This organization could be funded 
through the Defense Supply Agency, Funds would be made 
available based on the carefully projected require- 
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